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Abstract 
Much has been written about the reasons for and impact of marketisation on charities, their clients, 
and wider civil society. A central component of the marketisation thesis is that charities are substituting 
grants and donations with commercial revenue. However there is no consensus in the existing 
literature as to whether the two sources of revenue are substitutes or complementary. This paper 
shows that between 2003 and 2007 there was a significant increase in the proportion of overall 
revenue attracted from commercial sources by charities in England and Wales. Using our preferred 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation model we show that the annual persistence of 
commercial revenue over time was 44%. In particular, a +10% change in grants and donations was 
associated with a -3.1% change in commercial revenue. Thus commercial revenue is an inelastic 
substitute for grants and donations. We therefore conclude that charities are succumbing to market 
forces. 
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1. Introduction 
Charitable activity has traditionally caused much anguish for neoclassical economists as philanthropy, 
volunteering and co-operative behaviour fall outside of the scope of rational choice behaviour. Indeed, 
the very existence of charities poses fundamental questions to neoclassical economic theory 
(Halfpenny and Reid, 2002) which sees the world as bound by market exchange, rational choice and 
self-interested utility maximisation (Adaman and Madra, 2002). The economic explanation is to imply 
that charities exist because of imperfect or underdeveloped markets for public goods (Weisbrod, 
1975). However they are productively inefficient when compared to the private firm due to their ‘non-
distribution constraint.’ Effectively managers of charities have no incentive to minimise costs 
(Hansmann, 1987), and so are ‘crowded-out’ in fields where markets are well developed, but are over-
represented in fields such as health and social services where many consumers are unable to pay a 
market rate for the goods they consume (Hansmann, 1987). If conventional economic theory treats 
charities as an inefficient anomaly then the ‘solution’ is to propose that they behave as private firms in 
efficient markets. Achieving this ‘solution’ necessitates improving the operation of markets for public 
goods, and introducing market discipline to charities (Tsakalotos, 2005).  
It would appear that this neo-classical ‘solution’ is occurring in some countries. Since the 1980s 
Governments of both major parties in the United Kingdom have attempted to create more efficient 
markets for public goods through opening up the market for delivery of public services to providers 
from private and third sectors on a ‘best value’ basis (Newman, 2007). This process accelerated under 
the recent New Labour government as charities were given an enhanced role in economic policy 
(Haugh and Kitson, 2007). Another increasingly important aspect to this marketisation of the nonprofit 
sector involves the direct sale of goods and services by charities to consumers (Eikenberry and 
Kluver, 2004), and a more recent innovation, the creation of subsidiary social enterprises with the 
primary aim of providing employment to clients (Teasdale, 2010). Business and management scholars 
have turned their attention to nonprofits en masse to help them adapt to their new commercial 
environment (Dey and Steyaert, 2010). A range of ‘how to’ texts set out simple steps for nonprofits to 
follow in order to avoid dependence on grants and donations by increasing their share of commercial 
revenue, and to become more efficient through the imposition of market discipline (see for example 
Dees et al. 2001).  
A counter discourse warns of the dangers of this ‘economic fallacy’. In seeing things through a 
neoclassical lens that excludes the possibility of behaviour not bound by market exchange and rational 
choice (Adaman and Madra, 2002) we risk creating a world which loses sight of those values such as 
reciprocity, philanthropy and democracy (Tsakalotos, 2005). The study of nonprofits through this lens 
has valorised a particular income source – commercial revenue (Eikenberry, 2009), and a particular 
form – the social enterprise (Dey and Steyaert, 2010). As a consequence it is argued that nonprofits 
are behaving more like businesses in replacing traditional sources of revenue with commercial 
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revenue because they are expected, or even compelled to do so, rather than any rational assessment 
of the financial and social implications (Dart, 2004; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004).  
The purpose of this paper is not to further develop the literature explaining marketisation and its 
consequences. For while much has been written about the reasons for, and implications of, charities 
succumbing to market forces, rather less attention has been paid to developing the evidence base to 
support (or deny) the underlying assumptions upon which the marketisation thesis rests. In this paper 
we address this deficit by answering the critical question: are charities substituting commercial 
revenue for grants and donations, or are the two income sources in fact complementary? To do this 
we constructed a large panel data set derived from registered general charities’ annual returns to the 
Charity Commission for England and Wales for the period 2002-2008.
1
 These returns were each 
analysed to determine the proportion of revenue attracted through commercial sources (fees for goods 
and services; and surplus generated from subsidiary trading operations), and voluntary income (grant 
and private donations).
2
 All charities were classified according to the International Classification of 
Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) system. Using our preferred Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation model we found that commercial revenue was an inelastic substitute for grants and 
donations. Hence we conclude that charities in England and Wales are succumbing to market forces, 
albeit to a small extent.  
2. The marketisation thesis  
The term marketisation is used to refer to nonprofits becoming “more market driven, client driven, self-
sufficient, commercial or business like” (Dart, 2004, p. 414) that is, adopting the languages, practices 
and funding mechanisms of the private sector. It is possible to distinguish between two broad but 
overlapping aspects of marketisation. The first involves nonprofits seeking to mimic the organisational 
structures, practices and languages of the private sector. To some extent this trend also involves the 
re-labelling of charitable activity as social entrepreneurship, and there is a wide literature developing 
that follows this tradition, particularly in business and management schools (see Dees, 2007). The 
second aspect of marketisation which particularly concerns us in this paper focuses more narrowly on 
the ways in which nonprofits are funded. That is a supposed transfer from grants and donations to 
commercial revenue.  
Commercial revenue is itself a broad category (See Table 1) which is generally used to include 
program service fees; the sale of products not directly associated with the charitable activity; contracts 
to deliver services on behalf of a third party; profits from for-profit subsidiaries; and fees for endorsing 
products (Dart, 2004; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Kerlin and Pollak, 2010).  
 
                                            
1
 We dropped the year 2008 from the final model as there were changes in the way Guidestar UK classified 
commercial revenue leading to a discontinuity with previous data. 
2
 Investment income is not explored further in this paper, as it makes up a relatively small proportion of charities 
aggregate income. 
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Table 1. Types of commercial revenue 
Type of Commercial Revenue Description 
Fees for service Payments from recipients receiving goods and services 
directly from the organisations. 
Contracts to supply services Payments from government or other third parties for 
goods and services supplied. 
Sales of products not directly 
associated with charitable activity 
Payments for products which are additional to the charity’s 
core mission. For example the sale of Christmas cards. 
For-profit subsidiaries Profits derived from the activities of commercial 
organisations owned by the parent charity. 
Fee for endorsing products 
(advertising revenues) 
This relates to a trend in the US for nonprofits to develop 
commercial relationships with for-profit companies and 
receive funds for endorsing products. 
  
While charities attracting commercial revenue is not a new phenomenon (Teasdale, 2010), it is widely 
accepted that their reliance on commercial sources has increased significantly since the 1970s, and 
now makes up the largest source of revenue in both the US (Kerlin and Pollak, 2010) and England 
and Wales (NCVO, 2010). This trend is widely attributed in the United States to a decline in 
government grants and private contributions in the 1970s and 1980s leading nonprofits to pursue new 
revenue sources (Dees, 1998; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Froelich, 1999; Salamon, 1993; 1997). 
When counter posed with an aggregate increase in commercial revenue (Salamon, 1997), an 
assumption is made that commercial revenue was (and more importantly, remained) a substitute for 
grants and donations for the sector as a whole (Eikenberry, 2009).  
However, a systematic analysis of trends in nonprofit commercial activity in the US between 1982 
and 2002 shows that while commercial revenue rose by 219% over the period, private donations and 
government grants also rose (by 197% and 169% respectively) (Kerlin and Pollak, 2010). Other 
studies are inconclusive, and have drawn on small samples (LeRoux, 2005), focused on limited 
subfields within the sector (Guo, 2006; Kingma, 1995), or relied on changes between two time points 
rather than attempting to show trends (Foster and Bradach, 2005). Thus the only reliable evidence we 
have is that in the US there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of revenue attracted from 
commercial sources by nonprofits. This has been accompanied by a real increase in government 
grants and private giving to nonprofits over the same period (Kerlin and Pollak, 2010). But the 
marketisation thesis implies more than a gradual trend for charities to increase the proportion of their 
income attracted from commercial revenue. The term marketisation is used explicitly to refer to the 
substitution of traditional sources of nonprofit funding, that is grants and donations, by commercial 
revenues (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004).  
In England and Wales the changing political and economic environment during the period of 
Labour government between 1997 and 2009 are likely to have impacted upon charities’ revenue 
streams. Nicholls (2010) shows that in the US foundations, such as the Ashoka and the Skoll 
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Foundation, funded by the private sector, and promoting the market logics of that sector, are the 
dominant drivers of the commercialisation of nonprofits. He notes that a major difference in England 
and Wales is the enhanced role played by government in coercing charities to become more business-
like. For example, major grant programmes designed to facilitate charities becoming more sustainable 
through attracting commercial revenues, and the government’s creation and funding of umbrella 
bodies to provide support to nonprofits attracting trading income (Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Haugh 
and Kitson, 2007).  
A second institutional driver is the changing way in which government funds nonprofits in England 
and Wales. Under the recent New Labour government there was a pervasive belief that charities and 
other third sector organisations were best placed to deliver public services due to their responsiveness 
to the consumer (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). As the process of opening up public service delivery to a 
wider range of private and non-profit providers gathered pace in the new millennium, many charities 
saw increasing shares of their income derived through government contracts (Carmel and Horlock, 
2008). Together these institutional drivers would suggest that under New Labour, charities in England 
and Wales have been ‘encouraged’ to replace grants and donations with commercial income, whether 
through the delivery of government contracts or the private sale of goods and services. 
In England and Wales the annual Almanacs produced by NCVO (see NCVO, 2010) do 
demonstrate a gradual increase in reliance on commercial sources of revenue by charities since 2001 
(see Figure 1). As in the US this increase in commercial revenue has been accompanied by a slightly 
smaller real terms increase in government and private giving to nonprofits. It would appear then that 
for the aggregate population of charities, commercial revenue and grants and donations are 
complementary as both sources have risen in tandem.  
 
Figure 1. All general charities, commercial and total income since 2000/01 (£ billions) (derived 
from NCVO, 2010) 
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However it is not clear how the different income sources interact at the level of the individual charity. 
This is in part because, as in the United States (Kerlin and Pollak, 2010), the number of charities has 
also increased over the same time period (Backus, forthcoming), so demand for grants and donations 
(and indeed commercial revenue) may have risen faster than supply. Moreover, the period for which 
data is available has seen a dramatic increase in the aggregate funding available to charities, much of 
which came from statutory sources at a time when charities became a significant player in social and 
economic policy for the first time (Clifford et al, 2010; Haugh and Kitson, 2007).  
Nonetheless, it might be that diversification of revenue streams offers net benefits to charities. 
Froelich (1999) argues that commercial income shows only moderate revenue volatility (see also 
Carroll and Stater, 2009), and is the most flexible and least restrictive source of income available to 
nonprofits. From this perspective, pursuing commercial revenue is a rational diversification to reduce 
resource dependence (Froelich, 1999; Caroll and Stater, 2009), as the two sources of income may be 
complementary (Yetman et al. 2009). This theoretical approach draws upon ‘warm glow’ theory 
developed by Andreoni (1990) to help explain altruism from a neoclassical perspective. Andreoni 
theorised that individuals derive utility (a warm glow) from the act of giving to nonprofits they perceive 
as successful. Warm glow theory is usually used to explain why government grants to nonprofits may 
not crowd out private donations. Those nonprofits which attract government funding have a higher 
profile and so might be perceived by donors as more successful, thus ‘crowding in’ additional 
resources (Andreoni and Payne, 2011; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). While few, if any, studies draw upon 
warm glow theory to understand how commercial income responds to a change in grants and 
donations, it is reasonable to surmise that governments might behave in the same way as private 
philanthropists, and hence offer contracts to those organisations they perceive as successful, as 
evidenced by their grants and donations from private sources. Similarly, private individuals or 
companies purchasing goods and services from charities might be expected to be attracted to those 
charities which have high levels of grants and donations. Thus as grants and donations increase so 
does commercial revenue.  
To the best of our knowledge there are no studies in England and Wales which draw upon large 
scale data sets to determine whether commercial income is a substitute or complementary to grants 
and donations at the level of the individual charity. In the United States where data is available to 
conduct this analysis, most studies have treated grants and donations as the dependent variable (see 
for example Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Yetman and Yetman, 2003). Even here the evidence is 
mixed. This is in part due to the methods employed, which are largely descriptive, or unable to 
incorporate a dynamic model which can control for time effects (Tinkelman and Neely, 2010). Where 
studies have investigated the impact of a change in grants and donations upon commercial revenue 
the evidence is inconclusive. Segal and Wisbrod (1998) draw upon a relatively small sample of 2,679 
nonprofits observed between 1985 and 1993 and showed that after controlling for field and time 
effects there was a substitution effect in some industries but a complementary effect in others. The 
overall effect (-0.02) on the log of program service revenues (approximating to commercial revenue) of 
a one percent change in donations for the whole sample was not statistically significant. Segal and 
Wesibrod used a fixed effects model, probably the most appropriate technique at the time. However 
we show in our methodology section that econometric advances since their study mean that 
statisticians would not choose the same model today. Moreover technological advances in the 
processing power of computers now permit similar analyses to be carried out using larger samples, or 
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even the full population of charities. Therefore it remains unclear in the United States, and to the best 
of our knowledge has never been shown in England and Wales, whether charities are succumbing to 
market forces. Confirming (or denying) the marketisation thesis thus requires revisiting the research 
question (RQ1): 
RQ1. Is commercial revenue a substitute for grants and donations among charities? 
3. The data 
In order to determine whether commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations, in 
charities, we constructed a large panel data set using data collated by Guidestar UK from registered 
charities’ annual returns to the Charity Commission in England and Wales. This covered the period 
2002-2007. We included only general charities in our analysis. Thus our findings exclude public 
schools, NHS administered charities, independent hospitals, churches, housing associations, and 
grant making trusts. Our initial panel consisted of 277,537 observations for all 80,589 general charities 
providing accounts to the Charity Commission between 2002 and 2007 (i.e. each charity provided an 
average of 3.4 observations).  
To enable analysis by field of activity we matched all charities on our panel to the International 
Classification of Nonprofit Organisations (ICNPO) system originally developed by Salamon and 
Anheier (1998) to enable cross-national comparison between nonprofits operating in similar fields, 
using the ICNPO classification variable derived by NCVO
3
 for all general charities in England and 
Wales. 
Our main variables of interest are organisational size (size) (using overall income as an indicator); 
field of activity (ICNPO); overall income (i); voluntary income (iv); and commercial revenue (is). 
Commercial revenue provides our main dependent variable. Voluntary income (iv) was derived from 
the sub-categories of legacies; individual gift aid donations; individual non-tax effective donations; 
individual other donations; unspecified individual giving; and grants from other organisations (statutory 
and private). Commercial revenue (is) was derived from the sub-categories of: activities in furtherance 
of the charity’s objects; activities for generating funds; income from trading subsidiaries (gross) and 
associated expenditure; and unspecified sales and fees from operating activities. In this analysis we 
did not use investment income and other income. Although our original panel had observations for 
overall income (i) for each organisation in the population, for many organisations Guidestar UK was 
unable to separate commercial revenue (is) from voluntary income (iv). These cases were treated as 
missing, and so many (predominately smaller) charities were excluded from our analysis.  
Some commentators have warned of using English charity accounts to differentiate between 
income streams particularly for smaller charities (Clifford et al., 2010; Morgan, 2010). This is because 
only those charities with an income of £100,000
4
 or more are required to publish accounts to the 
standards set out in the Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) produced by the Accounting 
standards Board (Charity Commission, 2005). SORP standards provide detailed instructions for 
classifying different income sources. Therefore for those larger charities with an income of £100,000 
or more, data pertaining to commercial revenue and voluntary income are expected to be relatively 
robust.  
                                            
3
 Which is freely available at http://data.ncvo-vol.org.uk/?p=75 . 
4
 This has since changed to £250,000  
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We considered further restricting our analysis only to charities with an income of £100,000 or more 
in each year of the study. However when we ran our model using only these charities we found that 
results were virtually identical to those obtained using all charities. Many smaller charities also prepare 
accounts to SORP standards, although they are not required to do so by law. It may be that the 
smaller charities in our panel are biased towards those that prepare accounts to SORP standards, as 
Guidestar UK would have found it easier to separate commercial revenue from grants and donations 
for these charities.  
Our econometric analysis was conducted only using those organisations for which we have figures 
for total, commercial and voluntary income. The characteristics of this estimation sample are shown in 
Appendix A1. It is important to note the bias in our sample towards larger organisations which is to be 
expected given the reasons pertaining to SORP outlined above.  
Figure 2 presents graphically the rise in commercial revenue for the different fields of activity for all 
charities in our panel where we have an observation for is and iv, in both 2003 and 2007. First we 
note that reliance on commercial revenue has increased across (almost) all fields of activity. 
 
Figure 2. Commercial revenue as percentage of total, by field of activity, in 2003 and 2007 
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Table 2 begins to draw out the longitudinal element to our data. Here we see that the proportion of 
commercial revenue has risen in each year of our study, and that this appears to be partly, although 
not wholly associated with a decline in the proportion of voluntary income. This confirms existing 
findings from NCVO (2010) that charities’ reliance on earned income has increased relative to other 
revenue sources since 2001 in England and Wales. The lower means for all income sources in 2006 
shown in Table 2 are probably due to us having more observations from smaller organisations in this 
year. 
 
Table 2. Changes in our variables of interest over time 
Year Mean Income 
Mean 
Commercial 
revenue 
% 
Commercial 
revenue 
Mean 
Voluntary 
income 
% 
Voluntary 
income N. obs 
2003 £967,272 £493,221 51% £418,247 43% 15,412 
2004 £1,085,852 £560,191 52% £456,768 42% 14,317 
2005 £1,195,861 £640,839 54% £488,959 41% 14,042 
2006 £991,565 £537,991 54% £407,695 41% 18,385 
2007 £1,186,960 £654,693 55% £483,519 41% 15,468 
 
Table 3 largely confirms findings from the US that larger nonprofits attract a higher proportion of 
income from commercial sources than smaller nonprofits (Fischer et al. 2007; Guo, 2006). A relatively 
small number of observations for organisations with an income above £100,000,000 means findings 
for this group (which over-represent medical research charities, and organisations not elsewhere 
classified) should be treated with some caution.  
 
Table 3. Summary of proportion of total income that is commercial revenue in 2003-2007, 
derived using aggregate amounts for fields. 
 
 % of overall income that is commercial revenue 
Income Band (£) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
0-9,999 44.9% 54.6% 54.6% 39.0% 44.7% 
10k-99,999 46.9% 46.8% 47.0% 45.8% 49.0% 
100k-999,999 49.8% 46.2% 47.6% 48.9% 50.8% 
1,ML -10 ML 57.4% 53.5% 55.5% 58.1% 58.2% 
10ML-100ML 55.8% 56.5% 55.4% 58.0% 61.5% 
 100 ML- Plus 35.2% 44.4% 52.1% 48.0% 44.0% 
Average 51.0% 51.6% 53.6% 54.3% 55.2% 
N. Charities 15,412 14,317 14042 18385 15468 
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4. Econometric strategy  
In table 4 we show the correlations (all in log scale) between commercial revenue (     ), total income 
(    ) and voluntary income (     ). As can been seen, the bivariate relationships between all the 
variables are all positive, and are all statistically significant. This largely confirms the data presented 
by NCVO (2010) showing that for the population of charities before controlling for time and field 
effects, commercial revenue is complementary to grants and donations. It is worth noting the high 
association between commercial revenue in consecutive years within organisations, with a 0.86 
correlation. This lends support to Froelich’s (1999) argument that commercial revenue is relatively 
stable over time. 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix: income sources 
     
                          
     
     
      1    
        0.858 1   
     0.755 0.723 1  
      0.277 0.299 0.672 1 
      
In table 5 we describe how much income varies between organisations, and how much income occurs 
within them over time. The ‘between’ variation shows the variation between the average values in 
each organisation, the ‘within’ variation shows the degree of change for individual organisations over 
time compared to their own mean. For total income, around 77 per cent of the total variation is 
between organisations, and 23 per cent within organisations. These figures imply that the grouped 
nature of the organisational data needs to be captured in any statistical approach, as the observations 
are clearly not independent of each other. 
 
Table 5. Total, between and within variation of incomes in the sample of charities analysed 
  Standard Deviation    
 Mean Total  
st. dev 
Between Within n. 
charities 
Observations 
     £1,080,025 8,216,884 6,364,110 1,151,771 33,581 77624 
      £448,651 4,414,996 3,353,913 1,244,772 33,581 77624 
      £575,057 4,679,832 3,419,525 1,384,740 33,581 77624 
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Methodology 
In order to determine whether commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations, and to 
estimate the strength of any substitution effect, we developed a multivariate analysis which captures 
the dynamic composition of charities’ income over the period covered by our dataset.  
All monetary variables are expressed at 2008 constant prices. We use the following specification 
(1) for charities (i) over time (t). Variables are expressed in natural logarithms and denote: commercial 
revenue (     ) and voluntary income (     ). S is a set of sector dummy variables to control for possible 
effects of different areas of activity (ICNPO classification), T is a set of time dummies (yearly) to 
capture both the economic business cycle and the commercialisation effect over time. The last two 
terms are the components of the error term (with ui capturing charity-specific so-called ‘fixed effects’). 
 
Equation 1. Specification of our model 
                                         
                   
                
 
In this equation i and t label charities and years respectively,         is the one-period lag of the 
charity’s (log) commercial revenue, and    is included to capture charity-specific unobservable 
characteristics. A negative α2, would demonstrate that commercial revenue is a substitute for grants 
and donations, while a positive α2, would demonstrate a crowding in or complementary effect. 
The reasons for including the lagged dependent variable         as an independent variable are both 
econometric and interpretative. From a methodological point of view, the persistence of commercial 
revenue is very high (ρ=0.86) (see Table 4). From an interpretative point of view any explanation of 
present commercial revenue necessarily involves considering the role of previous commercial revenue 
(Tinkelman and Neely, 2010).  
There are several econometric issues that need to be considered in the estimation of equation (1).  
 Voluntary income (     ), is assumed to be endogenous – part of the model rather than externally 
determined. Causality may run in both directions (commercial revenue affects grants and 
donations and vice versa), with the potential for voluntary income to be correlated with the error 
term. 
 Time invariant charity characteristics (‘fixed effects’) may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. 
 The presence of the lagged dependent variable         gives rise to a problem of autocorrelation 
in standard linear regression and fixed-effects models. 
 The panel is unbalanced, with some charities having more observations than others. It has also 
a short time dimension with small T and large N. 
The above dynamic specification cannot be correctly estimated by a standard pooled linear regression 
(pooled OLS). The error term is likely to be correlated over time for a given charity and this correlation 
violates an important assumption that is necessary for the consistency of OLS. 
An intuitive way to address the fixed effect is to draw out the error term by entering dummy 
variables for each charity: the Least Squares Dummy Variables approach (LSDV). A similar way to 
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address the same problem is dividing the regression in two steps, first applying a mean-deviation 
transformation on each variable, than running an OLS on the transformed data. This is the within-
group, or just ‘within’ estimator (WG), estimating the same coefficients as LSDV but with a slightly 
better standard error. 
The LSDV and WG estimators are consistent only if there were no lags of the dependent variable 
(commercial revenue). However, in a dynamic model, the WG and LSDV estimators are biased 
(Nickell 1981; Roodman 2006). In order to eliminate such problems we use the General Method of 
Moments (GMM) adopting the approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
5
  
Two different versions of GMM have been developed to estimate equation (1), based on different 
approaches to instrumental variables. We estimate both GMM-DIF (differenced – transforming the 
data) and GMM-SYS (system – instrumenting differenced values with levels). These are intended to 
deal with the endogeneity of some explanatory variables. We use the Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) and 
the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) for over-identification of instruments and the first and second order 
serial correlations to choose our best specification of the model and the best set of instruments. The 
Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) and Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) require the non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The first and second order serial correlations test (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) require the rejection of the null hypothesis of first order serial correlation and at the 
same time not rejecting the null hypothesis of second order correlation. We compute a robust 
Windmeijer (finite sample) corrected covariance matrix (see Windmeijer, 2005). 
5. Results and interpretation 
In estimating equation (1) we anticipate a positive α1 capturing the persistence effect of previous 
commercial revenue. A negative α2, would demonstrate that voluntary and commercial revenue are 
substitutes, while a positive α2, would demonstrate that commercial and voluntary income are 
complementary. If α2 were to vary considerably by field of activity this would show that any substitution 
effect between voluntary and commercial revenue varies significantly across fields of charitable 
activity in England and Wales between 2002 and 2007.  
In table 6 we report the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the whole sample. In columns 
(1) and (2) we report OLS and fixed effects estimators, while in columns (3) and (4) the random effects 
and GMM-SYS are reported. Our most reliable benchmark is the last column (4). Since we know that 
the biases of OLS and fixed effects in estimating the coefficient on the lagged term coefficient are in 
opposite directions (Bond, 2002, pp. 4-5), the fact that GMM-SYS estimation of this coefficient lies 
between the two can be considered as confirmation of the adequacy of the chosen estimation 
methodology (Roodman, 2006). In terms of the standard GMM-SYS diagnostic test, the AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests are both reassuring, while the null hypothesis of correct instrumentation (Hansen test) is 
rejected at the 1% level. However, we are not overly worried by the failure of the test. Neither the 
Sargan nor Hansen tests should be relied upon too faithfully, as they are prone to weakness 
(Roodman, 2006, p. 12). In order to detect possible bias from multicollinearity we have calculated the 
                                            
5
 Data processing was carried out using Stata 11, and GMM estimations were conducted using the routine 
xtabond2; see Roodman (2006) for details. 
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variance inflation factor (VIF) which ranged from 1 to 2.27, averaged 1.25, and never exceeded the 
threshold value of 5 (see O’Brien, 2007).  
Table 6 shows that there is a lagged effect (α1) on              of 0.44 in our preferred model. 
Having controlled for the other variables in the model, this implies that 44% of commercial revenue is 
‘explained’ by commercial revenue in the previous year, a strong but not overwhelming level of 
persistence of commercial revenue in the same organisations over time. This would suggest that 
previous assumptions in the literature that commercial revenue is stable over time, and thus marks a 
rational resource diversification for charities (Froelich, 1999) should be revisited using up to date 
models. The sign of the coefficient (α2) demonstrates that other things remaining equal a 10% decline 
in voluntary income is associated with a 3.1% increase in commercial revenue. Thus we can say that, 
at least in a small way, commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations.  
 
Table 6. Dynamic panel models of commercial revenue [log(is)
6
] 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Fixed effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
GMM-SYS 
     
             0.84 
[0.002]** 
 0.08 
[0.043]** 
0.70  
[0.002]** 
0.44 
[0.021]** 
           0.0176 
[0.002]** 
-0.177  
[0.036]** 
-0.010 
[0.024] 
-0.312 
[0.161]* 
Constant 1.75 
[0.285]** 
11.62  
[0.061]** 
3.30  
[0.03]** 
9.34 
[1.748]** 
S Yes No Yes No 
T Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs 77,624 77,624 77,624 77,624 
R-sq 0.73 0.01 0.737  
Within 
between 
 0.02 
0.07 
0.013 
0.737 
 
Hansen    6.22 
p value    0.044 
AR(1)    -19.76 
p value    0.000 
AR(2)    2.03 
p value    0.042 
 
                                            
6
 *significant at 5%;**significant at 1% 
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We repeated the estimation of equation (1) for each of ten broad groupings of ICNPO categories. This 
allowed us to estimate the persistence and substitution effects for the different nonprofit fields of 
activity. In table 7 we report the estimation of equation (1) for the five sub-groups, based on ICNPO, 
where the substitution effect varied significantly from general representative charities. We only report 
the GMM-SYS estimations, our preferred approach.  
We found significant differences in the persistence of commercial revenue (α1) across all fields of 
activity. This could be explained by the rapid changes in the policy environment effecting charities in 
some fields more than others. Certainly there would appear to be some (negative) connections 
between persistence effects and the extent of any substitution effect.  
Of particular interest the substitution effect between voluntary and commercial revenue (α2) varies 
significantly from general representative charities in four of the ten fields (see Table 7). The fields of 
social services (-0.70) and law, advocacy and politics (-0.56) showed a greater substitution effect than 
the average for all charities. It may be that these fields in particular saw an increase in government 
funding through contracts to deliver public services over the period. Certainly legal advice provision 
through Citizen’s Advice Bureaux saw increased funding of this type over the period of New Labour 
government (Teasdale et al. forthcoming). Of particular interest is that for charities in the international 
field, commercial revenue is complementary to voluntary income. That is other things being equal, a 
10% increase in grants and donations is associated with an 8.6% increase in commercial revenue. 
 
Table 7. Statistically significant variations in substitution effect by field of activity, Dependent 
Variable log(is)
7
, different ICNPO classification 
ICNPO Field n 
charities 
Persistence effect Substitution effect 
Culture and arts 3,482 0.43* -0.32 
Social services 7,199 0.39* -0.69* 
Law and legal services 791 0.30* -0.56* 
International 941 0.59* +0.86* 
Overall model 33,581 0.44** -0.31* 
                                            
7
 *significant at 5%;**significant at 1% 
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6. Concluding remarks 
We set out to explore whether charities in England and Wales were succumbing to market forces. 
Drawing upon a longitudinal dataset constructed from charities’ annual returns between 2002 and 
2007 we have confirmed existing findings that charities’ reliance on earned income has increased 
relative to other revenue sources in England and Wales. The increase in commercial revenue 
occurred across almost all fields of activity.  
Proving the marketisation thesis requires demonstrating that at the level of the individual charity, 
commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations. Using the GMM model to control for time 
and field effects, we have shown that commercial revenue was an inelastic substitute for grants and 
donations over the period. Hence we can say with some degree of certainty that charities in England 
and Wales are increasingly dependent on commercial revenue, and that this is an inelastic substitute 
for grants and donations. We thus conclude that charities are succumbing to market forces in England 
and Wales. We believe our study is the first to demonstrate and estimate this substitution effect in 
England and Wales. 
Our research has implications beyond providing an underpinning to the theoretical literature on 
marketisation. One part of the existing literature posits that turning to commercial revenue is a rational 
diversification for nonprofits as this revenue source is more stable than, and complementary to, grants 
and donations (Froelich, 1999). In making use of the latest econometric techniques and controlling for 
time and field effects we have shown that commercial revenue is a substitute for grants and donations. 
The stability of commercial revenue may also be lower than has previously been assumed. This paper 
would suggest that more careful consideration of potential revenue sources may be required by 
charities in different fields. To better enable charities to make these choices, foundations, 
governments and academics across the world should once more turn their attention to the interaction 
between different revenue sources available to nonprofits, particularly now that the tools to permit 
more intricate analyses are available.  
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Appendix  
Table A1. Characteristics of our estimation sample by organisational field of activity (ICNPO). 
% Commercial revenue derived using aggregate amounts for fields.  
ICNPO n obs n charities average 
income 
2003-2007 
% 
commercial 
revenue in 
2003 
% 
commercial 
revenue in 
2007 
Culture and Arts 8,906 3482 £824,050 50% 52% 
Sports 1,970 924 £860,974 52% 59% 
Other Recreation and Social 
Clubs 
552 322 £92,607 64% 65% 
Primary and Secondary 
Education 
6,327 3,177 £227,326 42% 52% 
Parent Teacher Associations 1,194 748 £63,900 57% 65% 
Educational Foundations 412 188 £297,724 42% 40% 
Higher Education 176 72 £480,722 44% 51% 
Other Education 1,027 394 £1,181,656 51% 59% 
Research 2,002 809 £684,159 43% 48% 
Medical Research 544 187 £8,535,987 36% 37% 
Hospitals and Rehabilitation 1,976 805 £672,809 42% 44% 
Nursing Homes 1,354 422 £2,675,890 50% 52% 
Mental Health and Crisis 
Intervention 
1,696 650 £1,150,115 39% 48% 
Other Health Services 1,066 399 £2,030,645 44% 49% 
Social Services 16,863 7,199 £1,399,546 45% 51% 
Emergency and Relief 693 286 £1,897,619 36% 48% 
Income Support and 
Maintenance 
991 484 £686,581 36% 41% 
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Environment 2,179 863 £1,520,887 40% 49% 
Animal Protection 1,944 714 £1,517,225 40% 43% 
Economic, Social and 
Community Development 
6,228 3,032 £287,323 50% 57% 
Housing 2,603 1,061 £1,150,128 54% 55% 
Employment and Training 1,228 485 £2,616,284 45% 50% 
Civic and Advocacy 
Organisations 
1,554 665 £668,857 35% 44% 
Law and Legal Services 1,919 791 £657,369 37% 44% 
Grant-making Foundations 2,016 992 £1,068,994 33% 35% 
Other Philanthropic 
Intermediaries and 
Voluntarism 
1,526 592 £1,023,099 33% 43% 
International Activities 2080 941 £3,302,723 34% 38% 
Religious Congregations and 
Associations 
6232 2,759 £491,547 38% 39% 
Business Associations 194 79 £855,452 78% 77% 
Professional Associations 166 57 £934,368 67% 66% 
Not elsewhere classified 6 2 £101,042,56
5 
0% 1% 
Total 77,624 33,581 £1,080,025 44% 49% 
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